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The Concept of Alternative Facts 
 
Tommi Lehtonen 
Faculty of Philosophy 
University of Vaasa 
 
Tässä artikkelissa tehdään selkoa vaihtoehtoisen totuuden käsitteestä. Tulokseksi saadaan vaihtoehtoisen 
totuuden 18 merkitystä, jotka eivät ole toisiaan poissulkevia vaan osittain päällekkäisiä. Tarkastelu perus-
tuu uutisointeihin, jotka koskevat presidentti Donald Trumpin hallinnon synnyttämää mediakeskustelua 
vaihtoehtoisista totuuksista, totuuden jälkeisestä ajasta ja valeuutisista. Lisäksi hyödynnetään esimerkkejä 
kaunokirjallisuudesta (mm. George Orwellin kirja ”Vuonna 1984” sekä ”Sokeat ja norsu” -kertomus) ja 
filosofisesta keskustelusta (mm. klassinen tiedon määritelmä, tieto-opillinen relativismi sekä dekonstruk-
tionistinen käsitys kielestä ja totuudesta). Johtopäätöksenä esitetään, että ongelmattomin tapa ymmärtää 
”vaihtoehtoinen totuus” on liittää se inhimillisen tiedonkyvyn ja -hankinnan näkökulmasidonnaisuuteen. 
Sen mukaan perusteet jonkin väitteen esittämiselle ovat usein valikoivia ja rajoittavia. Lisäksi sama ilmiö 
voi näyttäytyä erilaisena riippuen siitä, mikä on tarkastelun fokus ja mitkä ovat tarkastelun välineet. Eri-
laiset mutta yhteensopivat käsitykset voivat siksi olla toisiaan täydentäviä osatotuuksia pikemmin kuin vaih-
toehtoisia totuuksia. 
 





This paper analyses, from a philosophical perspective, the concept of “alternative facts”. 
The related concepts of “post-truth” and “fake news” are also discussed, albeit with a 
lesser focus. The concept of alternative facts is philosophically interesting because it 
seems to call into question a set of widely accepted, folk-psychological standards of truth 
and knowledge. These standards include the following: there is only one truth about every 
single issue and the opposite of truth is not another truth, but falsehood. 
 
The term “alternative facts” can be understood to have at least two principal meanings. 
First, it can refer to a statement known to be false but deliberately presented as being true, 
that is, a lie. Second, “alternative facts” can refer to an error or something mistakenly 
accepted as true. This can be a claim that is possibly true (and there may even be some 
evidence for its being true) or a claim that could be true, but is not (i.e. a claim that is true 
in some possible world). 
 
In relation to the latter meaning, the concept of alternative facts could also be favourably 
interpreted as follows: If a claim and its negation are both equally justified (i.e. there are 
equally valid reasons or equally strong evidence in support of either claim), they can be 




the claim and its negation remain alternative possible facts). If new compelling evidence 
for one claim is found, that claim is said, in the language of epistemic probability, to be 
more probably true than the other claim. In view of this and other philosophical consid-
erations, the concepts of alternative facts, post-truth and fake news are discussed in this 
paper. 
 
2 Alternative Facts on Trump’s Inauguration 
 
I am a father of five children who loved to listen to fairy tales and stories. So, you are 
going to have to excuse me if I start with a reference to a fairy tale. Alternative facts are 
like the emperor’s new clothes. In the so-named story by Hans Christian Andersen, a child 
expresses what adults also see but what they have declined to believe until then: “The 
Emperor hasn’t got any clothes on!” More generally, the story teaches us to ask in what 
respect, and to what extent, we are inclined towards self-deception and self-assertion.
  
Another literary reference is also worth mentioning. In George Orwell’s novel 1984, self-
deception and one’s conflicting beliefs are called “doublethink”. It is self-deception to 
see something, but believe against it. For example, it is self-deception to see a major nat-
ural disaster (such as climate change) approaching, but to believe that nothing has to be 
done. Moreover, it is contradictory to believe that something does and does not hold true. 
For example, it is inconsistent to believe that refugees, even though human beings, do not 
have human rights. It is said that after Donald Trump’s rise to power the interest in Or-
well’s dystopia increased markedly (The Guardian, 24 January 2017). The reason is all 
too clear: the protagonist of the novel, Winston Smith, is an official of the Ministry of 
Truth who forges history so as to be pleasing to the powers. The Trump administration is 
also accused of being guilty of manipulation of the facts. 
 
The term “alternative facts” has been a hot topic in the current presidency of the United 
States. The phrase was coined by Kellyanne Conway, an advisor to President Trump, 
during a Meet the Press interview in January 2017. In that interview, she defended the 
former White House press secretary Sean Spicer’s statement about the attendance num-
bers at Trump’s inauguration. When challenged during the interview about the statement, 
Conway said that Spicer was giving “alternative facts” (Fandos 2017). Conway later de-
fended her choice of words, defining alternative facts as “additional facts and alternative 
information” (Seipel 2017). 
 
In the era of Trump and Brexit, Oxford Dictionaries has declared “post-truth” to be its 
2016 international word of the year. It is defined by the dictionary as an adjective “relating 
to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public 
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”. The editors said that use of the term 
“post-truth” had increased by around 2,000 % in 2016 compared to the previous year. The 
spike in usage, it said, is in the context of the referendum to leave the European Union in 




the United Kingdom and the presidential election in the United States. Oxford Dictionar-
ies’ word of the year is intended to reflect the passing year in language. “Post-truth” has 
been included in oxforddictionaries.com, and the editors will monitor its future usage to 
see if it will be included in future editions of the Oxford English Dictionary (The Guard-
ian, 15 November 2016). 
 
“Fake news” has acquired a certain legitimacy after being named word of the year 2017 
by Collins, following what the dictionary called its “ubiquitous presence” over the pre-
ceding 12 months. Collins Dictionary’s lexicographers, who monitor the 4.5bn-word Col-
lins corpus, said that usage of the term had increased by 365 % since 2016. The phrase, 
often capitalised, is frequently a feature of Trump’s rhetoric; in the last few months alone, 
he has tweeted of how “the Fake News is working overtime” in relation to the investiga-
tion into Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election, and of how “Fake 
News [is] weak!” Trump has used the term frequently, and has claimed to have invented 
it – “the media is really, the word, one of the greatest of all [the] terms I’ve come up with, 
is ‘fake’ … I guess other people have used it perhaps over the years, but I’ve never noticed 
it,” he told an interviewer. This etymology was disputed by the dictionary. Collins said 
that “fake news” started being used in the noughties on US television to describe “false, 
often sensational, information disseminated under the guise of news reporting”. Its usage 
has climbed since 2015, according to the dictionary, and really took off in 2017, and its 
ubiquity was acknowledged with a place in the print edition of the Collins English Dic-
tionary (The Guardian, 2 November 2017). 
 
3 Philosophical Remarks on Alternative Facts 
 
You may tremble out of fear or disgust when you hear about alternative facts and the 
“post-truth era”. You may be afraid that our mutual confidence is crumbling and that lying 
is becoming commonplace. You may also hate liars earning unmerited favour and society 
becoming morally debased. Despite this emotional unattractiveness, the concept of alter-
native facts also has some more tolerable uses. One of them is legal: “alternative facts” is 
a term used in law to describe inconsistent sets of facts put forth by the same party in 
court. What is presupposed in such cases is that there is plausible evidence to support 
different alternatives. The term “alternative facts” is also used to describe competing facts 
for the two sides of the case (Dictionary of Law). 
 
Even if the term “alternative facts” is not an established philosophical concept, it has been 
used (right or wrong) to characterize certain epistemological tenets of deconstructionism, 
a 20th-century school of philosophy initiated by Jacques Derrida in the 1960s. Decon-
structionism is a theory in literary criticism that exposes contextual limitations of tradi-
tional concepts of certainty, identity and truth. Moreover, deconstructionism asserts that 
words can only refer to other words and not to a reality independent of our thinking about 




how statements in any text subvert their own meanings. Especially in the context of de-
constructionism and postmodernism, one can be afraid that the beast of relativism lurks 
behind the idea of alternative facts – or so it is assumed. However, a closer look reveals 
that the relativism charge against deconstructionism is unwarranted and distorts the nature 
of the project. Derrida (1999) argued against relativism, basically using the same argu-
ment as below. A less biased account of Derrida’s philosophy of language could possibly 
hold that exposing conceptual limitations is a way of introducing alternative facts. Radical 
relativists, for their part, are much more straightforward in their approach. They say that 
all values and beliefs are relative, except relativism itself which is unconditionally true. 
This claim reveals the inherent contradiction in radical relativism. The claim also reveals 
that there is value relativism and epistemic relativism, among other forms of relativism. 
Plato’s Theaetetus dialogue includes a well-known definition of knowledge: “Knowledge 
[is] true opinion accompanied by reason” (201c–d). This definition is better known in the 
form “knowledge is justified true belief”. It does not follow from the classical definition 
of knowledge as such that alternative facts would be conceptually impossible. However, 
that conclusion follows from these additional assumptions that were already mentioned 
in the introduction: 
 
1. There is only one truth about every single issue. 
2. The opposite of truth is not another truth, but falsehood. 
 
According to the first assumption, no alternative facts or truths exist. According to the 
second assumption, there are various falsehoods: first, the contradictory opposite of a 
truth and, second, an inexhaustible set of contrary opposites of a truth. Contradictory op-
posites cannot be simultaneously true and cannot be simultaneously false, whereas con-
trary opposites cannot be simultaneously true. For example, white and non-white are con-
tradictory opposites. Therefore, anything is either totally white or not totally white and 
nothing totally white can simultaneously be totally not-white. Examples of contrary op-
posites, in turn, are white, black, red, blue, yellow and all different colours. Accordingly, 
if something is totally white, it cannot simultaneously be totally black, but if totally re-
painted for example in blue, it is then both not-white and not-black. As stated, it follows 
from the above assumptions 1 and 2 that there are no alternative facts. Instead, there is an 
infinite set of truths or true sentences and an infinite set of falsehoods including both the 
contradictory and contrary opposites to truths. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the concept of alternative facts can also be understood 
to be about the probability of a claim and its opposite. A concrete example of this is a 
weather forecast that predicts a 50 % chance of rain. Thus, it is equally probable that there 
will be no rain. Raining and not raining are alternative possibilities in terms of equal 
probabilities. The future will show which prediction is more reliable. 
 
It is said that Mr. Trump considers climate change as a Chinese hoax and sees his own 
view as an alternative fact. He let people understand that researchers of climate change 




are wrong. He also seems to assume that a claim can possibly be paraded as true if there 
are at least a handful of persons (or self-proclaimed “experts”) who support it. Thus, Mr. 
Trump allows testimony to be a source of knowledge, and in this he is basically doing the 
right thing, or at least not automatically the wrong thing. This does not mean, however, 
that Mr. Trump (or anyone for that matter) is doing the right thing by soliciting inexpert 
authority or ideologically-bound advice. He should be more careful in the choice of ex-
perts to whom he listens. According to climate sceptics, researchers are wrong because 
they interpret their observations in a wrong way, exaggerating risks and gloomy pro-
spects. Mr. Trump shares this view and underestimates the value and reliability of scien-
tific research. However, in light of scientific knowledge, denying climate change is as far 
from the truth as the east is from the west. Mr. Trump shows opportunism because he also 
makes a clear-cut distinction between truth and falsity when it serves his own goals. This 
becomes clear in his criticism of fake news that is, in reality, facts that put his own words 
and politics in a questionable light. 
 
4 Different Points of View 
 
Based on what I have presented so far, the concept of alternative facts is at least dubious. 
If the “dung heap of alternative facts” is turned really hard, can something valuable be 
found? What comes up is the following. The most plausible way to understand alternative 
facts is to take it to refer to different points of view and different perspectival views. If 
perspectives yield alternative facts, these facts are objective correlates to the points of 
view. Thus, along these lines, alternative facts are not thought to be subjective. 
 
Though the term “point of view” is used in everyday language and in science, its meaning 
remains ambiguous and unspecific. In its most concrete sense, “point of view” refers to 
the physical, spatial, and temporal position from which something is seen or viewed. Fig-
uratively, it refers to the perspective from which a subject or event is perceived or a story 
narrated. This figurative meaning is closely related to another meaning, for a point of 
view can also refer to a person’s state of mind or opinion. It has been suggested that there 
is at least one common feature in the different uses of the expression “from x’s point of 
view”. The expression indicates that the grounds for stating the sentence that follows are 
somehow restrictive and limiting. Therefore, if a statement is made from a certain point 
of view, then the implication is that not everything has been taken into account or not all 
relevant possibilities have been considered, and that only some of the aspects of an object 
are selected, depending on interests, aims, values, background assumptions, and so on. 
Thus, a selective mechanism is associated with a point of view. For this reason, it can be 
said that “from x’s point of view” is, in a sense, an antonym for “absolutely” or “thor-
oughly” (except when x is a dogmatic authority addressing a believer) (Hautamäki 1986: 





One of the best-known demonstrations of different points of view is the story about the 
blind men and an elephant. The story is originally from Udâna, part of the Pali Canon of 
Theravada Buddhism, dated to about the mid-1st millennium BCE. The story illustrates 
how knowledge acquisition is dependent upon one’s point of view. The story also teaches 
that the limitations of a point of view can easily lead to misunderstandings, mistakes of 
scale and excessive simplification. The story goes like this: 
 
Once there was a certain king who said to a certain man, “Gather together all the people who have 
been blind from birth.” “As you say, your majesty”, the man replied and, rounding up all the people 
who had been blind from birth, he went to the king and said, “Your majesty, the people who have 
been blind from birth have been gathered together”. “Very well then, show the blind people an ele-
phant”. To some of the blind people he showed the head of the elephant, saying, “This, blind people, 
is what an elephant is like”. To some of them he showed an ear of the elephant, saying, “This, blind 
people, is what an elephant is like”. To some of them he showed a tusk … the trunk … the body … 
a foot … the hindquarters … the tail … the tuft at the end of the tail, saying, “This, blind people, is 
what an elephant is like.” 
 
Then, the man went to the king and said, “Your majesty, the blind people have seen the elephant. 
May your majesty do what you think it is now time to do”. Then the king went to the blind people 
and asked them, “Blind people, what the elephant is like.” 
 
The blind people who had been shown the head of the elephant replied, “The elephant, your majesty, 
is just like a water jar”. Those who had been shown the ear of the elephant replied, “The elephant, 
your majesty, is just like a winnowing basket”. Those who had been shown the tusk of the elephant 
replied, “The elephant, your majesty, is just like an iron rod”. Those who had been shown the trunk 
of the elephant replied, “The elephant, your majesty, is just like the pole of a plow”. Those who had 
been shown the body of the elephant replied, “The elephant, your majesty, is just like a granary”. 
Those who had been shown the foot of the elephant replied, “The elephant, your majesty, is just like 
a post”. Those who had been shown the hindquarters of the elephant replied, “The elephant, your 
majesty, is just like a mortar”. Those who had been shown the tail of the elephant replied, “The 
elephant, your majesty, is just like a pestle”. Those who had been shown the tuft at the end of the 
tail of the elephant replied, “The elephant, your majesty, is just like a broom.” Saying, “The elephant 
is like this, it’s not like that. The elephant’s not like that, it’s like this”, they struck one another with 
their fists. That gratified the king. (Udâna VI.4). 
 
What this story teaches us can be summarized as follows: Our point of view is always 
limited and the same phenomenon can appear differently depending on what the focus of 
examination is and what the tools of examination are. Different but compatible views can 
therefore be “partial truth-claims”, complementing each other, rather than “alternative 
facts”. Moreover, people who see only one side of things are apt to engage in quarrels 
and disputes. 
 
5 Other Meanings of “Alternative Facts” 
 
In another sense, “alternative facts” can refer to what are called “white lies”. A much-
used example of a “white lie” is related to the question of whether the truth should always 
be told (whatever the cost) to a terminally ill patient. Depending on the person and situa-
tion, we may have a strong desire and need to tell an “alternative fact” – for example, that 
“there is always hope” or that “miracles can happen”. Such selected facts, “white lies”, 




cannot be condemned outright because they are intended for encouragement or consola-
tion of the patient or are presented due to one’s own anxiety or helplessness. Such “white 
lies” are human. However, it is very problematic if the president of a superpower ad-
vances alternative facts and goes against the scientific community. Such “alternative 
facts” deserve to be revealed to be what they really are which is evasive lies. Thus, 
Trump’s “alternative facts” do not ultimately appear to be white lies – rather, they are 
deliberate deceptions designed to proselytize ideologically sympathetic voters.   
 
In mathematics as well as in more inexact sciences, the correct result can be achieved in 
several ways like in the equations 2 + 2 = 4 and 2 × 2 = 4. In such cases, it is not question 
of giving alternative facts but different ways or methods to achieve the same results. In 
the social sciences and the humanities, scholars study entities and events that are, in a 
certain sense, created rather than found. Examples of such created systems are society, 
money and marriage. These entities can be conceptualized and defined in different ways. 
For example, different concepts of a society can be constructed based on the ideals of 
socialism and the ideals of neoliberalism. Another example is the Western view of society 
and the Islamic view of society. It is unclear to what extent these different views of society 
speak about the same thing, because the norms and assumptions behind these views are 
so different from each other. However, it is not necessary to think that different views of 
society are about alternative facts. Rather, it is more plausible and informative to say that 
different views of society represent and endorse different and even conflicting values and 
ideals, ideologies and political objectives. 
 
Scholars of the humanities often consider truth as an intricate and complex attribute. Let 
us take the quality of social and healthcare services as an example. Even though experi-
encing such a quality is a very subjective issue, authorities in many countries have tried 
to define certain criteria for measuring the quality of social and healthcare services. Ac-
cordingly, the following question is often presented: based on whose criteria, or from 
whose point of view, should the quality of social and healthcare services be defined? One 
can maintain that the “experienced truth” of an individual (be he or she a sick child, an 
old man or the mother of a big family) is also a truth, even if it is strongly bound to person, 
time and place. At least part of these views that are different in terms of points of view 
seems to belong to the group that can be called “partial truths”. For example, different 
individuals’ personal experiences about the quality of social and healthcare services can 
be taken as partial truths. The story about the blind men and an elephant can also be 
understood to illustrate “partial truth-claims”. 
 
Opinions regarding the right amount of public debt are perhaps an even more complex 
example of “contingent truths”. First, these opinions are related to decision-making in the 
face of uncertainty. We do not know all the factors that will affect the results of different 
public debt resolutions or, at least, we are not certain what values the different social, 




future. One can say that in this kind of situation, different prognoses are the best we can 
have. The issue becomes even more complex because people can become aware of the 
prognoses that concern their actions and under the influence of this awareness they can 
decide to act against the prognoses. One could say that in these cases “truth” is created 
and not found. 
 
The social sciences are not fertile ground for producing truth if we think that truth is an 
easily findable entity. Social scientists produce views for which various assumptions form 
the bases. If the same assumptions are shared by different persons, nothing in principle 
prevents them from coming to the same result. However, assumptions are often not the 
same and so it is logical that, for example, the state debt is an issue for one person but not 
necessarily for another person. Both persons may be right, as far as their different as-
sumptions are taken into consideration in evaluation. There is no one truth about the debt. 
Neither view is an “alternative fact” in the sense of a statement known to be false but 
deliberately presented as being true and so neither person is lying. 
 
6 Alternative Facts and Different Theories of Truth 
 
The above-presented cases and interpretations of alternative facts dovetail nicely with 
what is called the coherence theory of truth. According to that theory, if it is necessary to 
speak about truth at all, the term refers to the coherence or compatibility of a claim with 
other claims (that are considered to be true or assumed to be rational). Very different 
views about public debt can all be internally coherent. As desirable as it may seem, the 
coherence theory does have the disadvantage of requiring a concept of the whole which 
in the case of public debt, would need to be reached through both empirical evidence and 
consensus politics, before recommending a decision. Note also that the fairy tale of the 
emperor’s new clothes is also coherent, even if fictional. 
 
However, outcomes other than consistency and compatibility are also longed for from 
scientific research. In science, empirical evidence as well as practical functionality and 
applicability play a central role as the criteria for truth. One can say that speaking about 
alternative facts matches better with the coherence theory of truth than the correspond-
ence theory of truth. According to the latter, truth is about the correspondence of a claim 
(view, theory) with reality (Audi 1998: 246–250). The advocates of the correspondence 
theory should concentrate on evaluating their basic assumptions and especially whether 
there is empirical evidence in support of them. It can be the case that we have convincing 
evidence both for increasing the public debt and decreasing the debt. A further question 
is: What is the reason for this? Are there factors in the total context of debt such that they 
should be particularly taken into account before recommending increasing or decreasing 
the debt? 
 




As has been seen, the concept of alternative facts was launched, in a way, by the Trump 
administration, relating to the blatant lie regarding the turnout for the presidential inau-
guration. In that case, alternative facts were relatively easy to be shown to be false. The 
difference is not necessarily so clear in more interesting and practically relevant cases. 
Politically delicate issues in the social sciences, as well as in the mass and social media, 
are inevitably value-bound and often there is also uncertainty regarding how empirical 
evidence available in such issues should be interpreted. As already noted, an example of 
a politically delicate issue is public-sector debt. Fully rational and convincing arguments 
can be presented both for and against the view that public debt should be increased, and 
the same is true of its opposite, namely, the view that public debt should be decreased. At 
issue here is from whose perspective the question of public debt is considered: from the 
point of view of creditors or debtors, the poor or the rich, the young or the old, or from 
the point of view of future generations?  
 
However, if we would consider this issue from the vantage point of a hypothetical average 
consumer, the issue still would not be clear. Moreover, the matter depends, for sure, on 
the starting points – what the expected economic increase is or the starting level of debt 
is, and so on and so forth. If there is a true belief regarding the debt issue, there are also 
possible false beliefs regarding the same issue. However, I do not believe that we have a 
waterproof way to show – based on scientific argumentation – whether, for example, Fin-
land should increase or decrease public-sector debt. Opinions regarding the debt issue 
that are more or less well-grounded can and should be presented. However, the real point 
is the fact that even if we can conceptually distinguish between this kind of relativism and 
alternative facts as a pure lie, the distinction is more difficult to be done in practice. One 
should almost be able to say in what sense a person thinks of something – whether it is a 
logical consequence based on his or her analysis and values or whether it is a kind of 
opportunistic promotion of one’s own good. One can be quite pessimistic about the ability 
of outsiders to make this distinction. 
 
In mathematics, it can be said that an alternative truth is the second solution of a quadratic 






Figure 1. The path of a football as an example of a quadratic equation. The figure is 
published with permission from the author, Ilari Lehtonen. 
 
As is evident in Figure 1, the question When does y equal zero? has two equally valid 
answers. Both are alternative facts. Of course, these answers are contextual. In the above 
two-dimensional example, these answers are dependent on the value of x. Hence, the two 
alternative facts can only be considered as such when the question is framed by a certain 
level of generality. There are two solutions to the question When does y equal zero?, but 
there is only one when the value of x is specified. This implies that alternative facts or 
pluralism of truth, for that matter, is an illusion created by the fact that there is an infinite 
number of ways to describe the same things, which are themselves produced by the hu-
man mind. Thus, ultimately, there are no alternative facts. Instead, there are various de-
scriptions of truths and falsehoods made from different points of view (as the story about 
the blind men and an elephant illustrates). However, the fabrication and use of alternative 
facts to spread falsehoods remains a danger. 
 
One can even say that if alternative facts existed there could be no common physical 
universe and solipsism, that is, the belief that one’s own self is all that exists, would be 
confirmed. According to metaphysical realism, there is an extremely large but discrete 
number of real occurrences proceeding in a time-dependent fashion in the world outside 
our minds. If this were not true, descriptions such as “A cat is on a mat”, “The cat is grey 
and furry” and “The walls of the room where the cat is are grey too” would not be com-
municable, since no similarities between them could exist. If no common, mind- and lan-
guage-independent reality exists, isomorphism between language and reality would be 
necessarily impossible. However, since truth is context-dependent, as remarked above, 
and no two observers are able to occupy exactly the same context, our descriptions of 
truth must only use non-specific terminology that acknowledges our incapacity to per-
ceive absolute solutions and points of view. We can also clarify this by paying attention 
to the difference between two-value logic and fuzzy logic. In two-value logic, a sentence 
can have only one or the other truth-value: true or false. In fuzzy logic, the truth-value is 
somewhere between zero (“certainly false”) and one (“certainly true”). As an analogy, 




there can be a situation in which it neither rains nor fails to rain, but is something in-
between: thus misty. Hence, it seems that “alternative facts” fit better to fuzzy logic than 
two-value logic. 
 
Finally, alternative facts can also be understood to refer to different paradigms or concep-
tual frameworks. The difference between two or more views, even in science, can be very 
small, but the difference may imply an entire shift in a belief system such as seems to be 
the case in the discussion between climate scientists and climate change sceptics. In that 
discussion, a crucial difference between parties may lie in what sort of evidence is taken 




I have tried to favourably examine the concept of alternative facts. As a result of the study, 
a rich catch has been taken. I have found 18 meanings of alternative facts. These meanings 
are partly overlapping and not exclusive. They are as follows: 
 
1. A lie deliberately presented as being true 
2. An error or something mistakenly accepted as true 
3. A claim and its negation that are both supported by equally strong evidence or equally valid 
reasoning 
4. The equal probability of a claim and its opposite 
5. “Doublethink” or self-deception by conflicting beliefs (Orwell’s 1984) 
6. “Additional facts and alternative information” (Kellyanne Conway) 
7. Inconsistent sets of facts put forth by the same party in court, or competing facts for the two 
sides of the case 
8. An implication of a deconstructionist view of truth and language according to which words can 
only refer to other words and not to a reality independent of our thinking about it 
9. Relativism claiming that everything is relative 
10. Different points of view and different perspectival views 
11. “Partial truths” that complement each other 
12. The experienced truth of an individual 
13. “White lies” 
14. Different ways to achieve the same results (e.g. 2 + 2 = 2 × 2) 
15. The fact that “truth” is created rather than found 
16. The second solution of a quadratic equation or similar polynomial function 
17. Fuzzy situations (e.g. neither rains nor fails to rain, but is something in between) 
18. Different paradigms or conceptual frameworks 
 
It seems to me that meanings 10, 11 and 12 that refer to the perspectiveness of human 
cognitive ability and knowledge acquisition are epistemically the most fruitful under-
standings of the concept of alternative facts. Those understandings highlight that the 
grounds for stating a claim are often selective and restrictive and that the same phenom-
enon can appear differently depending on what the focus of examination is and what the 
tools of examination are. Different but compatible views can therefore be “partial truths”, 
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